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C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 000690

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [PK](#)

SUBJECT: CONSTRAINTS ON NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH
PAKISTAN

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. The Government of Pakistan has sought to strengthen its nonproliferation image after the unmasking of the A.Q. Khan network revealed significant gaps in its ability to control and protect its nuclear assets. With substantial U.S. and international assistance, Pakistan has begun to improve its practices in several areas, such as export control. More can be done, but Pakistan's limited personnel and financial resources constrain USG options for expanding engagement. Effective prioritization of cooperative activities, including the extension by the USG of overseas invitations to GOP officials, will be required to best augment Pakistan's capabilities. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Following the A.Q. Khan affair, the Government of Pakistan recognized it had serious deficiencies in its nuclear control practices. Since then it has passed a weapons of mass destruction law, improved physical protection of weapons-related materials, established an interagency export control authority, and expanded the mandate of its nuclear regulator to enforce security and safety standards, among other actions. These improvements have come about in large part due to assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is clear the GOP takes these efforts seriously and is committed to continued engagement, though Islamabad also is motivated by a long-term desire to augment its civilian nuclear energy capability. GOP officials have conveyed their belief that nonproliferation bonafides are prerequisite to any nuclear power deal, even if such is a very distant reality.

¶3. (C) Despite this progress and Pakistan's stated interest in stronger controls, nonproliferation practices remain uneven. In many cases, the GOP has formulated plans for strengthened capabilities that it has not managed to implement fully. For instance, Pakistan's export control authority has developed control lists and regulations, but it is not yet operating its licensing review system. U.S. nonproliferation cooperation programs can continue to help with implementation. Given that Pakistan now possesses much of the equipment and technology to carry out these missions, U.S. efforts should focus on building capacity in the agencies charged with implementing these activities.

¶4. (C) Pakistan's limited financial and personnel resources constrain U.S. options for expanding engagement, however. The government agencies with responsibility for implementing nonproliferation programs--Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Bureau of Revenue, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory

Authority, and Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission--have little if any budget for travel. Furthermore, the pool of expertise at these agencies is very small and almost all cooperation flows through just a few individuals. The Disarmament Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, employs just three officials to handle the entire range of nonproliferation issues, including bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

15. (C) In recent weeks, Post has received several invitations for GOP officials to attend a variety of international nonproliferation meetings and conferences related to UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, nuclear forensics, and the Megaports Initiative, in addition to regularly-scheduled trainings and visits. The GOP probably would like to participate in all of these events in order to continue to rehabilitate its nonproliferation image. Post believes, however, that there is a substantial risk that overloading the GOP with these meetings will draw attention and resources away from the work required to implement effective proliferation controls.

16. (C) Effective prioritization of cooperative activities by the Department, including invitations to overseas meetings, will be required to best augment Pakistan's capabilities. It will also help alleviate the strain on the few GOP officials we rely on for cooperation. If GOP participation in a particular meeting is deemed important by the USG to the further development of Pakistan's nuclear security system, then the invitation should include USG funding of participation costs.

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